India’s Nuclear Safeguards: Not Fit for Purpose

India NSCurrently, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is considering India’s application for membership. In this context NSG members are reportedly discussing membership criteria for states not party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), including a requirement for clear and strict separation of current and future civilian nuclear facilities from non-civilian nuclear facilities. In this paper, John Carlson examines India’s Separation Plan and safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and shows that they do not meet this standard – that current arrangements create an unverified grey zone between military and civilian material, and are not sufficient to verify that India is not using safeguarded material to benefit military purposes.

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Nuclear Weapon Prohibition Treaty: A Safeguards Debacle

NPT Safeguards debacleSuccessive NPT review conferences have recognised nuclear disarmament will require safeguards that are both rigorous and universal. In concluding the nuclear weapon prohibition treaty, however, the negotiating states have failed to require a universal high safeguards standard. Rather, the treaty sets different standards depending on a party’s circumstances. This approach not only damages the treaty itself, but also the prospects for disarmament and potentially the NPT. If the text cannot be corrected, what should have been an inspirational treaty will instead remain divisive and counterproductive.

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Nuclear export controls and nuclear safeguards

export controlExport control of dual use goods developed since the early 70’s to counter nuclear proliferation. The paper provides an overview of dual-use export control issues also in relation with the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which requires States to provide declarations of the export of the controlled items listed in its Annex II, derived from the Nuclear Suppliers Group Trigger list. Recommendations for improvement are proposed.

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DEBATING DISARMAMENT - Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

debating disarmamentThe author offers a close analysis of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the treaty’s only article dealing with disarmament, focusing upon both its text and negotiating history, and assesses its applicability as a standard for judging treaty compliance.

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Identification of uranium signatures relevant for nuclear safeguards and forensics

3The paper describes the applicability of different characteristics (signatures) in nuclear safeguards and forensics for assessment of uranium material provenance in terms of production process. The study follows a uranium ore concentrate production from an ore to a U3O8 product. It turned out that rare-earth elemental pattern, radiochronometry (age of ore body and material production date), sulphur and organic impurities are useful to find out the origin or history of the material, while certain trace-elements and isotopics of Pb or Sr were found to be inconclusive. The results will be important to understand the signatures in nuclear safeguards and forensics.

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Risks and Fragmentation: Challenges and Strategies for Nuclear Policy Advocacy

InsightsIt is often said that while the number of nuclear weapons has decreased since the height of the Cold War, the risk of nuclear weapons use has increased. Yet as countries and multilateral institutions work to roll back rising nuclear dangers, the broader nuclear policy field often struggles to maintain focus and promote unifying strategies for addressing these dangers. This reflects a fragmented nuclear policy community, partially due to siloed expertise and competing prioritization of the risks.

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source: www.stanleyfoundation.org