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Commission proposes to modernise and strengthen controls on exports of dual-use items

EU proposalToday, the European Commission proposes to strengthen controls on exports of certain goods and technologies that – in addition to legitimate civilian applications – may also be misused for severe human rights violations, terrorist acts or the development of weapons of mass destruction. A main element of today's proposal is a new "human security" dimension in export controls, to prevent human rights violations associated with certain cyber-surveillance technologies. Furthermore, the proposal simplifies and harmonises the existing export control rules, in order to save time and money for EU exporters and national authorities. These export controls reflect the EU's commitment to international peace and security.

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Defining Noncompliance: NPT Safeguards Agreements

ACA articleThe process of determining noncompliance is an important aspect of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, as well as the only established mechanism for determining noncompliance with the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself. Noncompliance with an NPT safeguards agreement constitutes violation of Article III of the NPT, the obligation to accept safeguards on all nuclear material, and, depending on the circumstances, possibly a violation of Article II, the obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons.

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Anti-Doping Seals Can be Beaten

bunnMatthew Bunn explains how the recent Olympic scandal involving a Russian anti-doping laboratory shows that many “tamper-proof” seals are more vulnerable than people think. This has serious implications for preventing the theft of nuclear material.

Source: Harvard Kennedy School’s Project on Managing the Atom

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Deterring Safeguards Violations

policy outlookThe principal weakness of today’s nonproliferation regime is enforcement. Specifically, the international community seems unable to authorize and implement quick and robust action when a state breaks the rules. When the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) finds a state in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, the responsibility for finding an appropriate response falls largely on the United Nations Security Council.

Source: http://carnegieendowment.org

Proliferation Financing: The Potential Impact of the Nuclear Agreement with Iran on International Controls

Proliferation financingThe UN framework of controls on financing of proliferation included, until 16 January 2016, Implementation Day of the JCPOA, financial provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) and financial sanctions on DPRK and on Iran. To implement financial sanctions effectively, States were required to put in place appropriate legislation, structures and procedures that could also serve, at least in part, to implement financial requirements under resolution 1540.

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